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The burgeoning commentary on the two important election law cases,
Randall v. Sorrell and LULAC v. Perry, decided by the Roberts Court at the
end of the 2005 Term, has paid relatively little attention to the procedural
posture of the cases and the institutional processes by which they were
reviewed by the Court. This Article explores such elements by focusing on
the role of the unique procedural aspects of some election law cases, such
as the use of three-judge district courts with direct appeals to the Supreme
Court. These factors shed light on the Court's decision to decide the cases
in the first instance, as well as on the eventual content of the decisions. The
Article considers several examples of these institutional processes,
including the impact of the direct review provisions established by
Congress in some election law cases, the use of three-judge district courts,
and the effect of these institutional factors on agenda setting in the Supreme
Court and the impact on decision making in the lower courts. The Article
concludes by situating these institutional processes in the ongoing debate
over the propriety and level of the legalization of the law of democracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has not been reticent about deciding cases that
address issues concerning the administration of democracy and elections in
this country. By one measure the Court has decided an average of almost
sixty cases dealing with election law each decade from 1961 to 2000.1 This
pattern has continued, at a perhaps slightly reduced pace, since 2001.2 The
burgeoning literature on these cases will be augmented by that addressing the
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1 RiCHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH v. GoRE 1-3 (2003).
2 Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? The Roberts Court and the Future of Election Law, 57
S.C. L. REv. 669, 672 n.26 (2006) (listing twelve such cases decided by the Court from
January 2001 to January 2006).
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Randall v. SorrelP and League of United Latin American Citizens (L ULA C)
v. Perry4 cases decided by the Roberts Court at the close of the 2005 Term.
Much of this commentary, however, pays relatively little attention to the
effect of the procedural posture of the cases or to the institutional processes
by which they were reviewed by the Court. This Article focuses on those
factors, using Randall and LULAC as case studies. It explores the presumed
reasons for the Court to exercise its discretion to hear these cases in the first
place, as well as the possible impact of the institutional settings of the cases
on the eventual content of the decisions.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I considers the impact of the
special provisions, occasionally created by Congress, to govern litigation of
election law cases. In the two federal laws regulating campaign financing, at
issue in Buckley v. Valeo5 and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,6
Congress provided for special procedures for the cases to be litigated at the
trial and appellate levels. 7 Some of those procedures might account for
elements of the substantive criticism leveled at the cases. No such procedures
were at issue in Randall, which involved a state statute regulating campaign
financing. But Randall is not free from its own procedural complications, and
it is instructive to compare the three decisions with the procedural histories in
mind. Randall also involved arguably counter-intuitive examples of litigant
and amicus behavior.
Part II of the Article focuses on the role of three-judge district courts in
election law cases, particularly those involving reapportionment and certain
Voting Rights Act (VRA) cases. LULAC is one of many such cases that have
come before the Supreme Court. Since 1981, for example, the Supreme
Court has decided on the merits no less than thirty-eight cases involving
election law that came on direct appeals from three-judge district courts.8
3 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
4 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
5 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
6 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
7 Supreme Court cases other than Buckley and McConnell illustrate the operation of
special review procedures for election law-related legislation. See, e.g., Cal. Med. Ass'n
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 187-89 (1981); Bread Political Action Comm.
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 581-84 (1982); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 486-89 (1985).
8 Rick Hasen has helpfully compiled lists of election law cases decided by the
Supreme Court. See HASEN, supra note 1, at 172-74 (listing forty-four such cases from
1981 to 1990); id. at 174-75 (listing fifty-four such cases from 1991 to 2000); Hasen,
supra note 2, at 672 n.26 (listing fourteen cases decided, or to be decided, from 2001
through the end of the 2005 Term). In those time periods, eight, twenty-one, and eight
cases, respectively, were initially decided by three-judge district courts. To Hasen's list I
add Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006) (per curiam). See infra note 129. A list of
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Part II addresses a number of issues peculiar to this type of litigation,
focusing on LULAC. These include the staffing of the three-judge court; the
frequent adjudication of VRA claims by these courts, despite a jurisdictional
statute that only refers to reapportionment claims; the impact of a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court being available from trial court decisions,
bypassing the usual ladder of appeals that applies to other cases; and
doctrinal problems raised by the frequent practice of the Court summarily
affirming such cases, as opposed to setting them for briefing and oral
argument and resolving them on the merits.
Part III of the Article addresses the complementary issues of how the
Supreme Court sets its own agenda, and how election law decisions of the
Court affect lower court adjudication. The Court was not forced to decide
Randall and LULAC on the merits. It could have denied certiorari and
summarily affirmed (or reversed) those cases, respectively. This Part draws
on the literature addressing the Court's discretionary ability to set its own
agenda to speculate on why the Court decided to decide these cases in
particular, and election law cases in general. In a similar fashion, it considers
how the widespread complaint that much election law jurisprudence is beset
by a lack of doctrinal clarity affects lower court adjudication.
The Conclusion of the Article situates a focus on procedures and
institutional processes in the larger debate over whether the law of
democracy ought to be legalized, that is, whether and to what extent election
law and administration ought to be subject to review by the courts. It
suggests that wherever one comes out on this debate, greater attention should
be paid to the processes of legalization in this area, that is, how election law
cases are litigated in trial courts and are filtered up to and decided by the
Supreme Court. The Article concludes in an evaluative mode by offering
suggestions for reform.
II. CONGRESSIONAL DESIGN OF COURT REVIEW AND LITIGANT
BEHAVIOR IN ELECTION LAW CASES
A. The Buckley and McConnell Litigations
The federal government has regulated the financing, and related aspects,
of electoral campaigns for federal offices for much of the twentieth century.
9
these cases can be found in the Appendix to this Article. The number would be even
larger if one counted cases that were not decided after full briefing to and arguments
before the Court, but rather were summarily affirmed. See, e.g., Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S.
947 (2004). Such cases can nevertheless play important roles in election law
jurisprudence. See infra notes 107-17.
9 For a historical overview, see McConnell v. Fed Election Comm 'n, 540 U.S. 93,
115-19 (2003).
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Of the several congressional statutes passed over that period, apparently none
until 1974 provided any special procedures that litigants, and federal judges,
must follow in adjudicating legal challenges to those laws. The normal
course of events would be a suit filed before and a decision by a single U.S.
district judge, followed by an appeal to the relevant U.S. court of appeals,
followed by the filing of a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, which
possesses the discretion to grant or deny the writ.
To be sure, prior to 1974 Congress had established a special scheme to
govern adjudication of constitutional challenges to any federal statute. Early
in the century, Congress passed legislation providing that constitutional
challenges to state statutes, seeking injunctive relief, must be brought before
a three-judge district court. The membership of the court consisted of the
district judge before whom the case was originally assigned, and at least one
appellate judge of the circuit in which suit was filed. The remaining member
of the court was either a circuit or district judge. An appeal of a decision of
that court would be filed directly with the Supreme Court, which ostensibly
had to decide the case on the merits. It was thought that enjoining state
statutes was an important decision that would be given greater authoritative
weight by the public were there three deciding judges, rather than one.
Likewise, it was thought that there was a public interest in promptly
resolving such challenges, and one way to do that would be to provide a
direct appeal to the Court, bypassing the courts of appeals.' 0 For similar
reasons, Congress extended these procedures in 1937 to cover constitutional
challenges to federal statutes.11 Eventually, justices and judges came to
conclude that the three-judge district court was unnecessary and unwieldy in
these circumstances, and largely for those reasons this part of the legislation
was repealed in 1976.12 So prior to 1976, it was not unknown for
constitutional challenges to federal election statutes to be heard before a
three-judge district court. 13
10 For a lengthier discussion of the historical genesis of the three-judge district court,
see Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 83-85 (1996).
11 This legislation was one of the "few remnants" of President Roosevelt's Court-
packing plan that actually made it into law. 17 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4234, at 600 (2d
ed. 1988). It was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000).
12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, at 600-03. The jurisdiction of the three-judge
district court was restricted after 1976 to reapportionment cases, as further addressed in
Part II.
13 See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1048-57
(D.D.C. 1973) (three-judge court) (adjudicating constitutional challenge to Titles I and III
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat. 3), vacated
as moot, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
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Congress in 1974 apparently provided for the first time a special review
procedure for a challenge to a federal election statute. In the amendments that
year to the Federal Election Campaign Act, Congress first required that a
certain class of plaintiffs (namely, the Federal Election Commission (FEC),
"the national committee of any political party," or "any individual eligible to
vote in any election for the office of the President") could utilize these
procedures to launch a constitutional challenge, or a request for a declaratory
judgment or other relief, in a federal district court. 14 The district court was to
"immediately" certify all questions of constitutionality to the court of appeals
for that circuit, which was directed to hear the matter en banc. The circuit
court decision was to be reviewed by direct appeal to the Supreme Court, and
the legislation admonished the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court to
"advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the
disposition" of the case.15 These procedures were followed in the litigation
that culminated in Buckley v. Valeo,16 which (among other things) upheld
contribution limits but struck down restrictions on expenditures.
A similar pattern is found in the McConnell litigation. That decision
considered a constitutional challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA) of 2002,17 also known as the McCain-Feingold law. Section 403 of
the BCRA provided that any constitutional challenge should be heard
expeditiously before a three-judge district court in the District of Columbia,
with a direct appeal available to the Supreme Court. 18 Unlike the 1974
Amendments, the BCRA did not limit the types of plaintiffs who could
utilize these provisions. However, it did state that members of Congress
14 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
§ 315(a), 88 Stat. 1285 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1976)). Potential plaintiffs who
did not fall into these categories were "remitted to the usual remedies," Bread Political
Action Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 584 (1982), which presumably at
the time would have been a three-judge district court, though recall that option in these
circumstances was repealed in 1976.
15 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
§ 315(a), 88 Stat. 1285 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)-(c) (1976)).
16 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976) (per curiam). For a description of the procedural course of
the litigation, see id. at 7-11. The litigants in Buckley did not find these provisions to be
entirely straightforward. Because it was not clear that section 315 governed all
constitutional challenges to the 1974 Amendments, a three-judge district court was
constituted to hear certain challenges, and that court heard the case simultaneously as the
case was heard before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The three-judge court adopted
the opinion of the D.C. Circuit, and a direct appeal from that decision was filed in the
Supreme Court. Id. at 9 n.6.
17 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002).
18 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155 § 403(a), 116
Stat. 113 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (Supp. 2004)).
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could intervene in extant litigation or bring a challenge on their own.19 These
provisions were followed in the litigation that culminated in McConnell,20 in
which a majority upheld most of the important provisions of the BCRA,
which placed restrictions on soft money contributions and certain
electioneering communications.
Why were special review provisions set out in these laws? The
legislative history on these provisions is sparse, 2 1 but the primary intent
seems clear enough. Given their regulation of campaign finance for
presidential and other federal office elections, the drafters thought that a
prompt resolution of any legal challenge to these important statutes was
desirable. This is apparent from the face of the statutes, both of which direct
the federal judiciary to dispose of the case in a prompt manner, as well as
from what little legislative history there is. 22 Yet if promptness were the sole
consideration, then forbidding any constitutional challenge in any court
would have worked even better. The laws would not have undergone any
constitutional challenge in court and could have gone into effect
immediately. A less drastic alternative would have been to provide that one
court, say, the district court with no appeal, or the Supreme Court in an
original action, could hear a challenge. Apparently not willing to take such
unusual and controversial steps, the drafters fell back on more modest
changes to the normal process of litigation in federal court.
Perhaps there were other motivations as well. With the BCRA, for
example, the drafters followed the extant provisions of the three-judge
district court (and previously used, with respect to challenges to federal
statutes). The use of three judges rather than one suggests that the BCRA
drafters thought that three jurists were better than one when it came to the
coherence and acceptance of what was apt to be a controversial holding. The
controversy was generated by the lengthy discussion of First Amendment
issues during the legislative process of the BCRA, a controversy mirrored in
the drafting of the 1974 Amendments. It is not unknown for special court
19 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155 § 403(b)-(c), 116
Stat. 114 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h(b)-(c) (Supp. 2004)).
20 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 132-33 (2003) (describing the
litigation).
21 Bread Political Action Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 581-83
(1982) (making this point with respect to the 1974 Amendments).
22 Id. at 583 (discussing the intent of 1974 Amendments); Joshua Panas, Note, Out
of Control?: Congressional Power to Shape Judicial Review of New Legislation, 1 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 151, 163-66 (2002) (discussing legislative history of these provisions
in the 1974 Amendments and the BCRA). Most of the history is taken from statements
made on the floor of Congress. Id. For a critical discussion of similar provisions in other
federal statutes, see William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of
Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REv. 761 (1997).
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provisions in federal legislation to be shaped by anticipated litigation
challenging or involving the legislation. Supporters, or critics, of legislation
can in various ways use particularized judicial review provisions to attempt
to shape preferred policy outcomes with respect to application of the
statute. 23 Both supporters and critics of the BCRA in Congress, for example,
anticipated (some more eagerly than others) the inevitable constitutional
challenge. 24 Perhaps the supporters thought a federal district court in the
District of Columbia would, all things being equal, possess more legal
acumen and political sophistication than federal judges elsewhere, and be
more likely to uphold the law. 25 Critics of the law might have anticipated that
a majority of the Court would strike it down, and so they would have wished
for a process for the Court to quickly achieve that result. Indeed, some public
supporters of the BCRA may have secretly wished for a successful court
challenge, and perhaps the reverse was true as well. Then, too, perhaps some
members of Congress were genuinely conflicted by the serious and difficult
constitutional problems raised, and the special review provisions accentuated
the passing off of this problem to the judicial branch. So for various reasons
23 For general discussions of this phenomenon in Congress, see CHARLES R. SHIPAN,
DESIGNING JUDICIAL REVIEW: INTEREST GROUPS, CONGRESS, AND COMMUNICATIONS
POLICY (1997); Charles R. Shipan, The Legislative Design of Judicial Review: A Formal
Analysis, 12 J. THEORETICAL POL. 269 (2000); Joseph L. Smith, Judicial Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control: Congress's Strategic Use of Citizen Suits, 31 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 283 (2006); Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the
Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347
(1997); Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for
the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 583 (2005). For examples of legislation in which Congress provided for special
review provisions for expected constitutional challenges, see Neal Devins, Is Judicial
Policymaking Countermajoritarian?, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN
INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 189, 197 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004). All
members of Congress are, of course, not of one mind on this issue. At any given time,
various members will have different views on how much or little they should exercise
independent judgments on constitutional issues on proposed legislation, as opposed to
deferring such issues to the courts. For a good overview, see Bruce G. Peabody,
Congressional Attitudes Toward Constitutional Interpretation, in CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 39 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005).
24 Panas, supra note 22, at 164-66.
25 Consider that the D.C. Circuit in Buckley had upheld most of the law, a holding
reversed, in part, by the Supreme Court. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 10-11 n.7 (1976)
(per curiam) (describing holdings of the D.C. Circuit). Judicial challenges to various
federal administrative actions often are filed in the D.C. Circuit, either because Congress
vests exclusive jurisdiction there, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as
a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 712 n.69 (2007) (giving examples) or due to venue
rules. Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
976, 979 (1982).
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the existence of special review provisions may have been an implicit part of
the legislative deal that culminated in passage of the BCRA. 26
Additional evidence for the strategic drafting of judicial review
provisions can be found in the persons who were designated as being eligible
to use those provisions. Recall that the 1974 Amendments permitted the
FEC, the national committee of a political party, and anyone eligible to vote
for President, to bring suit under the special procedures. Those are broad
categories, but not of unlimited breadth. 27 Perhaps the drafters of the
Amendments wished to remove any doubt regarding the standing of
individuals or entities to challenge the law. 28 Yet, the very existence of the
26 For further discussion of the possible strategic behavior of the drafters of the
BCRA, see Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 843, 866-69. To
be sure, there are counterexamples of Congress in similar circumstances not creating
special review provisions. In the discussions in Congress and elsewhere that accompanied
the reauthorization of the expiring provisions of the 1982 Voting Rights Act (VRA), there
was considerable controversy over whether, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions,
Congress had the constitutional authority to reenact the preclearance provisions which
applied to only certain parts of the country. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Congressional
Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v.
Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (2005). The legislative history recognizes and discusses the
potential constitutional issues. See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 54-65, 92-94 (2006), as
reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 618, 654-66, 677-79. The renewal legislation that
passed, Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577
(2006), contained no special review provisions for an expected constitutional challenge.
In the absence of any such special provision, it would appear under existing provisions of
the VRA that such a challenge, by a political subdivision subject to the preclearance
process, would need to be brought before a three-judge district court in the District of
Columbia. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2000). Such a challenge was filed not long after
passage of the Act, and a three-judge district court was convened. Complaint, Nw. Austin
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-cv-1384 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2006) (on file
with author). Given these existing provisions, perhaps the drafters of the VRA renewal in
2006 felt no additional attention to that issue was necessary. Cf South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (permitting original action to be filed in the Supreme
Court to challenge the constitutionality of various provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act).
27 The categories did not include the trade associations that brought suit in the Bread
litigation. Bread, 455 U.S. at 578 (describing those parties).
28 Id. at 583-84 (discussing but finding it unnecessary to resolve whether this was
the intent). Congress is thought to have statutory authority, within limits, to provide that
persons can have standing to bring suit in an Article III court, where there might be
doubts that those persons would have standing to sue in the absence of the statute. For
discussion, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 143-56 (5th ed. 2003). Whether members of
Congress, and other lawmakers, had standing, by virtue of their office alone, to challenge
official action has been particularly unclear. Id. at 165-67.
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provision suggests that (some of) the drafters and their supporters wished to
facilitate a court challenge. A wide range of plaintiffs who fell under the
second and third categories brought suit in Buckley, including Senator James
Buckley, who had opposed the law. 29 A similar story is told by the history of
the BCRA. Initial drafts of that legislation addressed who might bring suit,30
but the final version did not expressly address the issue, with the exception of
stating that members of Congress could initiate a suit or intervene in an
extant suit. The exception might be driven by the uncertainty of whether
members of Congress would have standing, in the absence of an enabling
statute, to bring such a suit.31 But again, it facilitated the anticipated court
challenge to the legislation. Eleven separate suits were brought and later
consolidated, including those led by Senator Mitch McConnell and
Representative Ron Paul, both of whom had opposed the BCRA.32
How effective were these provisions in expediting and otherwise
facilitating the litigation process? First, consider the Buckley litigation. There
plaintiffs filed suit in U.S. District Court on January 2, 1975, the first day
after the 1974 Amendments went into effect.33 Moving promptly as
requested by Congress, discovery and briefing took place, the case was
argued before the D.C. Circuit on June 13, and that court handed down a
decision on August 29, taking up over 100 pages in the official reports. 34
Also moving promptly after appeals were filed, the Supreme Court held oral
argument on November 10, and rendered 294 pages worth of opinions in the
U.S. Reports on January 10, 1976.3 5 Because the federal judiciary took only
a little over a year to litigate this complex case, it would seem easy to
conclude that, if nothing else, the case was expeditiously resolved.
29 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7-8 (describing plaintiffs). Perhaps these provisions had the
intended legal effect, for the Supreme Court appeared to have some skepticism regarding
the justiciability of the case. The Court stated that the complaint "demonstrate[d] that at
least some of the" plaintiffs had standing. Id. at 12.
30 Panas, supra note 22, at 153-54, 157-58.
31 Id. at 159-61; supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32 The joint opinion in McConnell by Justices Stevens and O'Connor did not discuss
standing. The separate opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist for the Court found that
McConnell, Paul, and certain other plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain
provisions of the BCRA. 540 U.S. at 225-26. In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented on this point. Id. at 363-64.
33 This and other aspects of the litigation history of the lower court litigation are
found in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 901-04 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).
34 Id. at 821-934.
35 That number includes a ninety-page appendix to the per curiam opinion,
reprinting the contested provisions of the 1974 Amendments. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 144-
235.
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Perhaps, though, the speedy resolution came at a high cost. As
persuasively demonstrated by Professor Rick Hasen, "Buckley's drafting
history tells a story of the pitfalls of rushed drafting by committee,
particularly in a case raising complex issues of constitutional law and
statutory interpretation where the Justices did not all have well-formed ideas
in advance about how to resolve these complex issues." 36 The Justices self-
consciously took seriously the mandate to expedite their resolution of the
case,37 and while it would be unfair to characterize Buckley as a rushed job
(and Hasen does not), certain aspects of the opinion were not well thought
out,3 8 and some of that might be attributable to the unusual procedural
posture of the case.39
Next, consider the effect of the special review provisions in McConnell.
Like Buckley, that case started rapidly. Suit was filed on March 27, 2002, by
Senator McConnell and others, only hours after the President had signed the
legislation. But proceedings moved slower after that, due in large part to the
desire of counsel to engage in discovery, and that of the three-judge panel to
develop an adequate factual record. Oral argument was heard on December 4
and 5, and the court issued a lengthy opinion on May 1, 2003.40 Appeals
were promptly lodged in the Supreme Court, which established an expedited
schedule for briefing. Oral argument was heard on September 8, before the
normal start of the Court's October Term, and a lengthy opinion, taking up
over 270 pages in the U.S. Reports,41 was issued on December 10, 2003.
36 Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION
L.J. 241, 242 (2003). Professor Hasen draws on an extensive analysis of Justice Lewis
Powell's papers on the case.
37 Id. at 248.
38 The most prominent example was the brief statement by the majority in Buckley
that the statutory restriction on third parties making soft-money expenditures against or
on behalf of a candidate only applied when the ad used certain express language in that
regard, the much-discussed "magic words." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, 44 n.52. That
statement came late in the drafting process and arguably the Justices did not appreciate
the difficulties the language would cause. Hasen, supra note 36, at 242, 250-51. The
Court would eventually revisit the issue in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
540 U.S. 93, 189-94 (2003).
39 It has been frequently argued that Buckley was decided in an abstract context,
without the full benefit of a record on the likely or actual effects of the 1974
Amendments. To the extent that charge is true, some of it can be attributed to the
expedited nature of the review provisions. Panas, supra note 22, at 167-68.
40 A summary of the procedural history of the litigation before the three-judge
district court is found at McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 251 F. Supp. 2d
176, 206-09 (D.D.C. 2003) (per curiam) (three-judge court). The per curiam opinion and
the separate opinions of each of the three judges together fill over 800 published pages.
Id. at 176-919.
41 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93-365.
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The McConnell litigation thus took over twenty months to conclude, as
opposed to the thirteen months of Buckley. In each case, the Supreme Court
took about the same amount of time to hear the case and render a decision.
The longer time for McConnell can be attributed to proceedings in the district
court. On that score, there was acrimony, unusually expressed in a public
way, among the three judges. It begins with a per curiam opinion, signed by
U.S. District Judges Colleen Kollar-Kotelly and Richard J. Leon, but not by
Circuit Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson. That opinion included extensive
findings of fact and legal analysis. Separate opinions by each judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, followed. Judge Henderson was
highly critical of the time it took to produce an opinion, compared the delay
unfavorably to what she considered the far more expeditious treatment by the
lower courts in Buckley, and appeared to lay most of the blame on the other
judges.42 The judges on the per curiam opinion took issue with the
criticisms, arguing the extra time was taken up in needed discovery and court
review of a voluminous record, both of which, they asserted, were not
characteristic of the Buckley litigation. 43 Given the length, complexity, and
fractured nature of the opinions, it is no shock that "not any one opinion is
fully dispositive,"44 and among other things each opinion has its own lengthy
findings of fact.45
The controversial nature of the lower court proceedings in McConnell is
not that unusual for three-judge district court litigation. The usual model of
litigation in American jurisprudence has a single trial judge making findings
of fact in the absence of a jury, with one or two layers of appellate review by
multimember courts afterwards. Requiring three jurists to make and agree
upon such findings, especially in a very complex case, can produce the sort
of disagreement and awkwardness found in McConnell. Nor can the sniping
of the judges go unnoticed. Perhaps it is due in part to the fact that this
amalgam of judges normally does not sit together. District judges rarely
decide cases together, and trial judges and appellate judges usually act
separately. Moreover, trial judges presumably have considerable experience
managing discovery, making findings of fact, and engaging in a myriad of
tasks relevant to litigation at the trial court level, and rarely act in an
appellate capacity at that level. The reverse would be true for appellate
judges. While all of the federal judges in the District of Columbia share close
42 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 266-67 n.1 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
43 Id. at 207 n.36, 209 n.41 (per curiam).
44 Id. at 266 (per curiam).
45 Id. at 220-33 (per curiam); id. at 296-356 (Henderson, J., concurring &
dissenting); id. at 438-588 (Kollar-Kotelly, J., concurring & dissenting); id. at 813-918
(opinion of Leon, J.).
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quarters, it does not necessarily follow that they are comfortable in engaging
in joint decision making. It may not be entirely coincidental that the D.C.
Circuit, unlike most of the other circuits, does not regularly have district
judges sit by designation on the circuit.46
Perhaps all of this controversy would have been worth it had the end
result been celebrated. But it was not. The Supreme Court moved things
along, though in the end it produced fractured opinions as well.4 7 The end
result has not received glowing reviews.48 In the lower court, Judge
Henderson complained that the case had moved along too slowly. Perhaps
McConnell and Buckley moved too quickly, and the laudable desire of
Congress to expedite these cases, and the admirable following of that
mandate by a coordinate branch of government, contributed to the perceived
doctrinal deficiencies of those cases.49 In a larger sense, perhaps expedited
46 For further discussion of the points in this paragraph, see Solimine, supra note 10,
at 116-18. For documentation of the D.C. Circuit not having its district judges sit by
designation on appellate panels, see Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting
Justice on Appeal? An Examination of the Use of District Judges Sitting by Designation
on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 366-67 (1995).
Another reason that might account for the lack of harmony in McConnell was
suggested by Judge Tamm in the lower court opinion in Buckley. He mentioned, albeit in
passing, that under the special review provisions the D.C. Circuit served "primarily as the
jurisdictional prerequisite to ultimate Supreme Court disposition." Buckley, 519 F.2d at
921 (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This might be read to suggest
that the efforts of the lower court judges were somewhat irrelevant, since the Justices
were definitely going to review the case. Knowing this ex ante, lower court judges might
be motivated not to take their collegial responsibilities seriously. This probably reads too
much into Judge Tamm's comments, and I find it difficult to believe that any federal
judge, when faced with an important case like this one, would shirk her responsibilities,
even when Supreme Court review was a certainty. That said, I cannot entirely dismiss the
possibility that the fear of near-irrelevancy is found in the minds of able lower court
judges in direct review cases, when it is obvious that the Supreme Court will review the
case on the merits.
47 Though the opinions were not as fractured, or as long, as the opinion in the
district court. A joint opinion by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, and separate opinions
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer, on different challenges to the
BCRA, spoke for majorities of the Court. There were also five additional opinions,
concurring and dissenting in part.
48 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election
Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 503, 515 (2004) (The joint
opinion by Stevens and O'Connor "was mechanical and unreflective. Even ardent
supporters of reform were taken aback by its sloppiness. Many commentators simply
dismiss McConnell as an example of poor judicial craftsmanship.") (footnotes omitted).
4 9 See Allison R. Hayward, The Per Curiam Opinion of Steel. Buckley v. Valeo as
Superprecedent? Clues from Wisconsin and Vermont, 2005-2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
195, 206-08 (2006) (discussing whether additional time would have aided the Court in
announcing a better received doctrine in McConnell and other cases).
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review provisions rush election law cases up to the Court at a faster pace than
is optimal. In this regard, consider the less publicized sequel to McConnell in
Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission.50 There, litigants
used the special review provisions to challenge another aspect of the BCRA.
The primarily legal issue was whether a footnote5' in the Supreme Court's
decision in McConnell had left open the possibility of an as-applied, as
opposed to a facial, constitutional challenge to a certain part of the BCRA. A
three-judge district court answered in the negative. The Supreme Court heard
oral arguments and decided the case a mere six days later, holding in a brief
opinion that an as-applied challenge was permissible, and remanded for
further proceedings. 52 Knowing that other challenges to various BCRA cases,
under the special review procedures, were likely in the pipeline, 53 perhaps
the Court had BCRA-fatigue, and was happy to swiftly dispose of the case.
Or perhaps the Court preferred to grapple with the potentially difficult issues
on the merits via as-applied challenges, with a more robust record from the
lower court, as opposed to a facial challenge. In the end, we cannot conclude
that the expedited decision making demanded by the special review
provisions led to suboptimal results, but we should not rule out the reverse
either.
B. The Randall v. Sorrell Litigation
At first blush, the procedural posture of Randall v. Sorrel 54 may seem to
have little in common with Buckley or McConnell. Randall was a
constitutional challenge to a Vermont statute that placed limits on both
campaign contributions and expenditures to elections to state office there. A
constitutional challenge was brought through the normal process: first in
federal district court in Vermont,55 then on appeal to the Second Circuit,
56
50 126 S. Ct. 1016 (2006) (per curiam).
51 McConnell v. Fed'l Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 190 n.73 (2003) (joint
opinion of Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.).
52 Wis. Right to Life, 126 S. Ct. at 1018. The litigation returned to the Supreme
Court's docket in the 2006 Term. On remand the district court held for the plaintiff, see
Wis. Right to Life v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (three-
judge court), and upon appeal the Court granted review. 127 S. Ct. 1145 (2007).
53 E.g., Christian Civic League of Maine v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 433 F. Supp. 2d
81 (D.D.C 2006) (three-judge court) (facial challenge, denying motion for preliminary
injunction), appeal docketed, No. 05-1447 (U.S. May 11, 2006), motion to expedite
appeal denied, 126 S. Ct. 2062, dismissed as moot, 127 S. Ct. 336 (2006); Davis v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, Case No. 06-1185 (D.D.C. 2006) (three-judge court) (complaint filed
on June 28, 2006) (facial challenge) (on file with author).
54 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
55 Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (D. Vt. 2000).
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and then on a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Rapidity was not
an issue. Indeed, the opposite was true. Suits challenging the law, later
consolidated, were initiated in 1999, not long after the law went into effect,
and the district judge issued a decision upholding some challenges, and
denying others, in August of 2000.5 7 The normal appellate process ensued,
and in 2004, a split Second Circuit panel upheld the entirety of the statute,
though it remanded for further proceedings on the issue of whether the
expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to serve the interests of preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption. 58 Petitions for rehearing en banc
were filed and were denied the following year, accompanied by unusually
lengthy opinions concurring in or dissenting from that denial. 59 The Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari later that year and issued its decision in
June of 2006.
While outwardly this process was different from the special and direct
review procedures that governed in Buckley and McConnell, there are
similarities as well. For one, there was a sense that the Supreme Court was
highly likely to agree to review the case. The drafters and supporters of the
Vermont statute unapologetically viewed it as a direct challenge to the
regime of Buckley and its progeny, which put limits on the regulation of
campaign expenditures. 60 When the Second Circuit denied the challenge and
upheld the law, it seemed very likely that the Court would exercise its
discretion to review the case on certiorari. The issues involved were high
profile and did not lack for publicity. A split panel decision and the
publication of opinions concurring in or dissenting from denials for rehearing
en banc have been associated with a higher likelihood of a certiorari petition
being granted. The controversy generated by such opinions might encourage
lawyers to seek Supreme Court review, and such opinions may serve as a
signal to the Supreme Court that the case is an important one.61 So, this
particular case had the flavor of one governed by a direct review statute.
56 Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 105 (2d Cir. 2002).
57 Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D.Vt. 2000).
58 Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004). Judge Ralph Winter filed a lengthy
dissent. Id. at 149-210 (Winter, J., dissenting). The same panel had rendered a decision in
2002, but it was withdrawn when a motion for rehearing en banc was filed. Id. at 96-97.
The decision two years later took into account the intervening decision of McConnell.
59 See generally Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2005).
60 Hayward, supra note 49, at 201 n.31 (discussing intent of drafters of Vermont
law).
61 Michael E. Solimine, Due Process and En Banc Decisionmaking, 48 ARIZ. L.
REv. 326, 335, 335 n.60 (2006). The opinions in the Second Circuit were particularly
noteworthy, because that Circuit has a long tradition of rarely sitting en banc, and rarely
generates opinions accompanying a denial of rehearing en banc. Id. at 332; see also
Michael E. Solimine, Ideology andEn Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REv. 29, 57 (1988).
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Indeed, both the losers and winners before the Second Circuit supported
certiorari in the Supreme Court.62 Moreover, thirteen state attorneys general
and others who supported the Vermont law filed briefs recommending that
the Court take the case.63 These are curious moves by the supporters, in light
of the probability of reversal of the lower courts, and of the fact that the
Second Circuit had ordered a remand on an issue, which, if followed at that
point, would have postponed resolution of the entire case to a later-and
perhaps better situated--day. 64 The point was not lost on the three dissenting
Justices, who argued, among other things, that the Court's disposition was
"premature," and that the Second Circuit's remand order should have been
allowed to proceed to produce a more robust record in which to consider the
constitutional issues.65
This survey leads to several conclusions. Providing for direct review of a
lower court decision to the Supreme Court is no panacea. Cases litigated
under such statutes do not always lead to swift results, as intended by the
drafters. Whether they do or not, there remain problems of developing an
adequate record and affording careful consideration by lower court judges
and Supreme Court Justices to what are often complex and politically
62 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2487 (2006).
63 National Voting Rights Institute, Broad Coalition Urges U.S. Supreme Court to
Review Campaign Spending Limits Case (news release, June 15, 2005), available at
http://www.nvri.org/press/spendinglimitsrelease_061505.html. The filing of amicus
briefs in the Supreme Court by state attorneys general (SAG), alone or in combination, is
now common. For an overview of this phenomenon, see Michael E. Solimine,
Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Conservative Critique of the Eleventh Amendment, 101
MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1475-79 (2003) (essay review). Twenty-five SAG filed various
briefs in McConnell in the Supreme Court. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 113 n.t. In contrast,
only three amicus briefs were filed in the Supreme Court in Buckley, none by SAG. 424
U.S. at 6 n.t. Part of the explanation for the difference is the greater number of amicus
briefs filed in recent years in the Supreme Court in all cases, see Ryan J. Owens & Lee
Epstein, Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 134 (2005), and the
recent increased activism of SAG, see Solimine, supra note 62. Whether such briefs have
any effect on the Supreme Court, at the certiorari stage or the merits stage, is another
matter. For discussion of that point, see Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court:
Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in US. Supreme Court
Litigation, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 807 (2004); see also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
743 (2000). In Randall, the briefs filed by SAG did not appear to carry great weight, as
they were only mentioned in a dissenting opinion. 126 S. Ct. at 2509-10 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
64 Richard H. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence. Competition, Social Science, and
Balancing in Campaign Finance Law after Randall v. Sorrell, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 862
n.62 (2007).
65 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2512 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., and in part by
Stevens, J., dissenting).
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charged cases. The absence of a direct review statute, on the other hand, does
not automatically mean that rapid litigation is impossible, 66 or that an
adequate record will be developed.
II. THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT IN
ELECTION LAW CASES
A. The Structure and Functions of the Three-Judge District Court
In contrast to the recent special review provisions at issue in the Buckley
and McConnell litigation, the three-judge district court has a long history in
adjudicating relatively large numbers of election law cases. The court was
statutorily created in 1910, largely in reaction to the well-known Supreme
Court case of Ex parte Young, 67 which declared unconstitutional Progressive
Era legislation regulating railroads, and affirmed the issuance of an
injunction against the enforcement of the legislation by state officials. The
intent of Congress was that it was better to obtain the input of three federal
judges, rather then just one, when considering whether to issue injunctions
regarding the presumptively important issue of the constitutionality of
statewide legislation. To enable the case to be promptly resolved, the
legislation provided that a direct appeal should lie to the Supreme Court. The
66 Consider examples of how swiftly recent high profile election law litigation was
concluded in the absence of direct review statutes. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000) (per curiam) (litigated challenge to counting of votes in Florida for 2000
Presidential election); Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, No. A-06-CA-459-SS, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47115 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2006) (held improper for Tom DeLay to be
declared ineligible for reelection to seat in Congress, after he had resigned), affd, 459
F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006). Indeed, much election law litigation, in federal and state courts,
must take place rapidly to be resolved before an upcoming election. See Richard L.
Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to
Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937, 991-99 (2005) (discussing such
litigation). Such rapidity can be regarded as preferable to post-election litigation, since it
can be the only way for an aggrieved plaintiff to obtain an effective remedy, id. at 991-
92, while "[p]utting judges in the position of deciding election law questions when the
winner and loser of its decision will be obvious can undermine the legitimacy of the
courts." Id. at 993 (footnote omitted). On the other hand, the "absence of a complete
record.., and the press of time," id. at 999, can lead to suboptimal judicial consideration
of pre-election cases. Perhaps Buckley is an example of those costs. See Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 8 (2006) (per curiam) (reversing circuit court reversal of district
court denial of injunction in pre-election suit, in part "[g]iven the imminence of the
election and the inadequate time to resolve ... factual dispute[s]").
67 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The case was and still is significant, since it in effect creates
an exception to the Eleventh Amendment, which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and its progeny, prevents States from being sued in
federal court for constitutional violations. Solimine, supra note 10, at 83-84.
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coverage of the court was eventually expanded to include challenges to
federal legislation.68 By the modem civil rights era, three-judge district
courts came to hear over three hundred cases a year.69 In the wake of Baker
v. Carr70 in 1962, many such courts were convened to consider suits
involving the reapportionment of state legislatures or of congressional
districts from that state.71 By the 1970s, up to one-fourth of the cases decided
on the merits by the Supreme Court consisted of direct appeals from such
courts, involving both reapportionment and many other types of
constitutional cases. 72
Opposition to the three-judge court eventually arose in the federal
judiciary itself, in part based on the inconvenience of convening such courts
at the trial level, and in part due to the burden direct appeals placed on the
Supreme Court's docket. These concerns were brought to the attention of
Congress, which responded in 1976 by passing legislation 73 that limited the
jurisdiction of the court to constitutional challenges to the apportionment of
state legislatures or Congressional districts.74 Even limited in that way, such
courts still decide significant numbers of reapportionment cases each decade,
some of which find their way to the Supreme Court, with League of United
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry75 being an example. Both before
68 Solimiie, supra note 10, at 83-84.
69 Id. at 137 (tbl.1) (listing hearings before three-judge district courts in the years
from 1964 to 1994).
70 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding claim of malapportionment is cognizable under the
Equal Protection Clause and is not a nonjusticiable political question).
71 Solimine, supra note 10, at 91-93 (discussing reapportionment litigation from the
1960s to the 1990s); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels,
116 HARV. L. REv. 593, 646 (2002) (noting the "huge amount of the redistricting in the
United States [that] finds its way into the courts").
72 Solimine, supra note 10, at 85, 138.
73 Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976), codified in pertinent part at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284 (2000). Congress still occasionally enacts legislation, outside of the election law
context, that requires that any constitutional challenge to the legislation take place before
a three-judge district court. For examples, see Solimine, supra note 10, at 89-90 n.69.
74 Solimine, supra note 10, at 85-89. The Judicial Conference of the United States,
and the American Law Institute, came to support either the elimination of the three-judge
district court, or significant curtailment of the jurisdiction of the court. The legislative
record indicates that Congress left the court intact to handle reapportionment cases,
because of their "importance," and because "they have never constituted a large number
of cases." Id. at 88 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-204, at 9 (1975)). The only significant
opposition to the limit came from the NAACP, which argued that three federal judges
were sometimes necessary in civil rights cases to overcome the hostility of a single
district judge. Id. at 88-89. See also WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 4235 at 604-05
(discussing the 1976 amendment).
75 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
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and after the 1976 legislation, the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) permitted
political subdivisions covered by the preclearance requirements to bring an
action before a three-judge district court in the District of Columbia,
authorizing that court to issue a declaratory judgment regarding whether a
change in election procedure is consistent with the VRA.76 Preclearance
76 42 U.S.C. § 1973b-c (2000). For discussion of preclearance litigation, see Peyton
McCrary, et al., The End of Preclearance As We Know It: How the Supreme Court
Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 275, 280-83
(2006); Solimine, supra note 10, at 90-91. It is not entirely clear why a three-judge
district court in the District of Columbia was designated to hear these declaratory
judgment actions. The Supreme Court observed that the federalism concerns raised by
local governments needing the permission of the national government to change election
procedures suggested that a special court should be convened to resolve such an action,
see Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 562-63 (1969), a rationale similar to
that which motivated Congress in responding to Ex parte Young. The Court
acknowledged the possible burdens on local governments in litigating such actions in the
District of Columbia, id. at 559, but the Court, in earlier upholding the constitutionality of
certain provisions of the 1965 VRA, found the restriction of district court litigation to the
District of Columbia to be within Congress' power to regulate the jurisdiction of federal
courts. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966). Some opponents of the
1965 VRA criticized the restriction, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2488 (individual views of Rep. Willis) (restriction to the District of
Columbia "seems a gratuitous affront to some very fine Federal judges" outside of the
District); Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 359 (Black, J., dissenting) (Restriction forces "[s]tates
to entreat federal authorities in far-away places for approval of local laws."). The limit to
the District was apparently driven, in part, by traditional requirements that the proper
venue for actions against certain federal officials would be in the District, Katzenbach,
383 U.S. at 331-32, and perhaps by the presumed expertise and non-parochialism of
federal judges in the District. See ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 16-21 (1987) (discussing reasons
for and opposition to the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of § 5 when passed in 1965);
15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3815-3816 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing changes in venue
requirements in suits against federal officers). Efforts made during the 1970 renewal of
§ 5 of the VRA to extend venue of these actions to local U.S. district courts were
rejected, see DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 194-96 (1978), and the issue appears not to have been
expressly revisited since then. See THERNSTROM, supra, at 83-95 (discussing possible
changes to venue provisions of Section 5 in lead up to the 1982 amendment); Laughlin
McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: The
Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 TENN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1983) (observing that while
amending the VRA in 1970, 1980, and 1982, Congress continued to vest exclusive
jurisdiction of preclearance actions in the District of Columbia Court, "on the grounds
that it was necessary to provide uniform interpretation and application of the Act's




cases can be appealed to the Supreme Court but if they are, they are often,
though not always, summarily affirmed. 77
A cluster of procedural issues are unique to litigation before three-judge
district courts. According to the statute, the court consists of the district judge
to whom the case was originally assigned, and two other judges assigned by
the chief judge of the circuit, at least one of whom must be a circuit judge.78
Experience shows that in most instances federal judges from that state are
assigned, and usually only one, rather than the possible two, circuit judges
are assigned by the chief judge to constitute the panel. The vast majority of
three-judge district courts thus consist of two district judges and one circuit
judge. 79 Nonetheless, discretion in this regard lies entirely with the chief
judge, and controversy in some instances has attended the formation of these
panels. 80 The coverage of the statute has also been problematic. As noted, the
77 McCrary, supra note 76, at 281; see also Mark A. Posner, The Real Story Behind
the Justice Department's Implementation of Section 5 of the VRA: Vigorous Enforcement,
as Intended by Congress, 1 DUKE J. CON. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 120, 155-56 (2006);
Solimine, supra note 10, at 91 n.75. Historically, most appeals from three-judge district
courts have been summarily disposed of by the Court. Gonzalez v. Automatic Emps.
Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 99 n.17 (1974).
78 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1) (2000).
79 Solimine, supra note 10, at 114 (noting that of the 89 published three-judge court
cases from 1976 to 1994, only five had two rather than one circuit judge assigned). The
difference may not be inconsequential. Given the difference in status in the judicial
hierarchy, a district judge may feel excessively deferential to two circuit judges on a
panel, as opposed to just one. Id. at 117-18. Even two district judges may feel deferential
to the one circuit judge on the panel. A study of such panels from the 1960s suggested
that there was such deference, since it found that over 60% of the signed opinions were
authored by the Circuit Judge, more than one would expect if the opinions were assigned
randomly over the range of cases to all of the judges on the panel. Thomas G. Walker,
Behavioral Tendencies in the Three-Judge District Court, 17 AM. J. POL. Sci. 407, 411
(1973). My study of 89 such cases from 1976 to 1994 revealed less evidence of such
deference, as a third of the cases were per curiam, and the balance of signed opinions was
split between those authored by a circuit judge and a district judge. Solimine, supra note
10, at 119-20.
80 Commentators have suggested that chief judges may have the motive and
opportunity to "stack" three judge panels in reapportionment cases. E.g., Pamela S.
Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705,
1726-29 (1993). For an assessment of the historical evidence that can be brought to bear
on this issue, see Solimine, supra note 10, at 110-12. In 1995, I surveyed the chiefjudges
of all of the circuits to determine what criteria they employed to pick the judges. The
responses indicated that no formal criteria were used, but informally the chief judges
stated that judges from the forum state were almost always used, since they were
presumably more familiar with the facts of that case, and other factors, such as workload
and administrative issues, were also considered. A few responses even allowed that, far
from stacking panels, some chief judges took pains to "balance" some panels, presumably
taking into account the political affiliation or ideological outlook of the designees. Id. at
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statute only refers to constitutional challenges to reapportionment claims.
Nonetheless, courts frequently litigate related VRA claims, even though they
go unmentioned in the statute. Courts rarely speak to this issue, but
apparently this is thought to be uncontroversial because the VRA claim is
almost always factually related to the constitutional claims, and thus can be
said to fall within pendent jurisdiction.81
Another set of problems is associated with the direct review process.
Legislation dating from the origins of the three-judge district court permits
these cases, in theory, to be rapidly disposed of by the Supreme Court, if
appeal of the decision of the three-judge panel is sought in that Court.82 The
statute is separate from the legislation establishing the discretionary certiorari
jurisdiction of the Court, and it appears that, if the plain language of the
statute is followed, the Court has an obligation to resolve the appeal on the
merits. Yet in practice the Court has largely equated such appeals with those
reaching it by writs of certiorari, by summarily affirming (or, sometimes,
reversing) the appeals that it does not consider worthy of full consideration.
For the cases that are worthy, probable jurisdiction is noted, the case is set
for full briefing and oral argument, and an opinion is rendered. 83
113. Still, one must take such statements with a grain of salt, and more rigorous
examination of the assignment process is appropriate. For some steps in that regard, see
id. at 114-15.
81 See Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175, 187-91 (3d Cir. 2001). For further discussion,
see Solimine, supra note 10, at 95-97. This is not to be confused with a handful of
provisions of the VRA, and of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which require or permit a
three-judge district court to be convened to hear certain specialized matters. 17 WRIGHT,
supra note 11, § 4235, at 604-05. Nor should it be confused with the preclearance
provisions of the VRA, which permit declaratory judgment actions in certain instances to
be filed before a three-judge district court in the District of Columbia. See supra notes
76-77 and accompanying text.
82 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000). This provision does not have language directing the
Supreme Court to expedite its review of the matter, like the statutes in Buckley and
McConnell.
83 Solimine, supra note 10, at 107-09. There is evidence that the Justices treat
certiorari and appeal in a similar but not identical fashion. In his interviews with some
Justices and their clerks, H.W. Perry found that they took a more careful look at cases
that came to them by direct appeal, as opposed to the much larger number of cases that
came on writs of certiorari. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 104-05 (1991). For discussion of the statements of
the Court as a whole, and of individual Justices, on this issue, see ROBERT L. STERN, ET
AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 276-79 (8th ed. 2002). Another piece of evidence in this
regard is suggested by Rick Hasen, who discusses the drafting history of an important
election law case, Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966)
(holding poll taxes for state and local elections unconstitutional). That case was an appeal
from a three-judge district court, and in an early draft of an opinion dissenting from an
anticipated summary affirmance, Justice Arthur Goldberg suggested that he treated the
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Finally, direct review implicates the scope of appellate scrutiny by the
Court. In direct review cases, the Court may be forced or influenced to
engage in a time-consuming and extensive review of the facts, more so than
it would otherwise. Two factors seem to account for this. The absence of
intermediate appellate courts to consider and filter the legal and factual issues
in these cases might compel the Court to engage in unusually careful review
of the facts found by the trial court, and in a weighing of the evidence in the
record.84 The other reason is doctrinal. Recent Court decisions reviewing
decisions from three-judge district courts have held that while the familiar
deferential standard of not overturning a finding of fact by the trial court,
unless it is clearly erroneous, 85 will ostensibly apply, rigorous review of
two differently, and that a case where certiorari would ordinarily be denied might be a
candidate for full resolution on appeal. In his view, a summary affirmance is technically a
resolution of the case on the merits, and he felt "compelled to face up to the substantial
constitutional issues presented." HASEN, supra note 1, at 177-78 n.1 (reprinting draft
dissent). After this draft was circulated, the case was set for a full hearing, and the Court
eventually reversed. Id. at 36-38. Cf Sara C. Benesh, et al., Aggressive Grants by Affirm-
Minded Justices, 30 AM. POL. REs. 219, 223 (2002) (Empirical study did not distinguish
between certiorari and appeals, "notwithstanding the technical differences between
them... because both decisions... are largely discretionary today.") (footnote omitted).
84 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001) (suggesting that usual deference to
trial court fact finding is not present on direct appeals, since "there is no intermediate
court, and we are the only court of review") Cf Solimine, supra note 10, at 117
(suggesting that both three-judge district court cases, and other cases, can raise complex
issues of fact). A related issue is similar to one I explored earlier (see supra note 46): Do
judges on three-judge district courts take their jobs seriously, given the possibility of
direct review by the Supreme Court? Cf Edward B. Foley, "Narrow Tailoring" Is Not
the Opposite of "Overbreadth ": Defending BCRA's Definition of "Electioneering
Communications," 2 ELECTION L.J. 457, 457-58 (2003) (arguing that the McConnell
decision was "irrelevant," in light of fractured nature of the opinion, de novo review by
the Supreme Court of legal issues, and the Court's independent examination of evidence
in the record) with Karlan, supra note 80, at 1729 (noting that three-judge district court
decisions are practically unreviewable, since so few are subject to full review by the
Court). I think these judges on the whole do take their jobs seriously, in part since most
decisions of three-judge district courts are not appealed and, of those that are, most are
summarily affirmed. STERN, supra note 83, at 92; Solimine, supra note 10, at 109. On the
other hand, consider the situation if the normal adjudicative process applied; a single
district judge would know that her decision would be subject to at least one appeal as of
right. That said, the lower court judges in these situations are not oblivious to the
possibility of Supreme Court review and sometimes actively encourage it. E.g., Martinez
v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (three-judge court)
(Jordan, J., concurring) (urging the Court "to note probable jurisdiction in this case or one
of the other political gerrymandering cases arising from this electoral cycle").
85 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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factual findings will nonetheless take place.86 The Court has stated that close
review of the record and the factual findings made by the lower court may be
appropriate if the record is largely documentary. 87
B. The LULAC Litigation
Consider how several of these unique procedural and institutional
processes played out in LULAC v. Perry, which considered challenges under
the Constitution and the VRA to a mid-decade redistricting of the districts for
the members of the Texas delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives. A
majority of the Court held that the redistricting was not an invalid political
gerrymander, but that the redrawing of one district diluted the voting power
of Hispanics and amounted to a violation of section 2 of the VRA.88 The
lengthy and complicated litigation does not lend itself to easy summary, and
only a brief review is necessary here. 89 Litigation took place in a three-judge
district court early in this decade during an initial redrawing of such districts,
after the decennial census, and that court instituted a redistricting plan.90 Not
long after, Texas Representative Tom DeLay, the then-Republican Majority
Leader of the House, led efforts that convinced the Texas legislature to
redraw the districts again to make it more likely that the GOP share of the
Texas delegation would increase. Litigation again took place before a three-
judge district court, which in 2004 rejected all constitutional and VRA claims
by the plaintiffs.91 The Supreme Court in that year vacated and remanded 92
the decision in light of its intervening decision of Vieth v. Jubelirer,93 a
reapportionment case that held that political gerrymandering claims might be
86 E.g., Easley, 532 U.S. at 243. For an especially helpful and careful analysis of this
rigorous standard of factual review, see Melissa L. Saunders, A Cautionary Tale: Hunt v.
Cromartie and the Next Generation of Shaw Litigation, 1 ELECTION L.J. 173 (2002).
87 Easley, 532 U.S. at 243. Prior to Easley, "the Court has sometimes set aside trial
court findings of fact as clearly erroneous, even in voting rights cases coming to it on
direct appeal from three-judge courts." Saunders, supra note 86, at 186 (footnotes
omitted).
88 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
89 For a full review of the litigation, see LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2605-07
(2006) (discussing events from 1990 to 2005).
90 Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740 (E.D. Tex.
Nov. 14, 2001) (per curiam) (three-judge court), aff'dsummarily, 536 U.S. 919 (2002).
91 Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (three-judge
court).
92 Jackson v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004).
93 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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justiciable under certain circumstances.94 Upon remand, the three-judge
district court in 2005 reached the same conclusion.95 The Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal, and the Court rendered a decision
in 2006.
In a superficial way, the composition of the three-judge panel might be
characterized as an example of stacking (or, alternatively, as being finely
balanced). Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit is an appointee of
a Republican President, while Texas District Judges T. John Ward and Lee
H. Rosenthal are appointees of Democratic and Republican Presidents,
respectively. 96 The DeLay-inspired redistricting plan helped the GOP, so if
the judges were thinking in partisan terms, a majority might be expected to
uphold the plan. As noted, that is what occurred, and in the 2004 decision
Judge Ward dissented in part on the VRA claim. 97 In the 2005 decision
Judge Ward specially concurred, emphasizing that he did not accept all
aspects of Judge Higginbotham's majority opinion.98
This chain of events might be characterized as partisan decision making
by these judges, but this is a crude manner of evaluating the case. To be sure,
given the important, partisan consequences of many reapportionment and
VRA cases, one might reasonably expect even life-tenured federal judges to
be sensitive to the political consequences of the decision.99 But it is difficult
94 Vieth produced a 4-1-4 split. Justice Scalia, in a plurality opinion, did not dispute
that "severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution," id. at 292, but concluded
that an absence of judicially manageable standards made claims challenging such
gerrymanders to be nonjusticiable political questions. Justices Stevens, Souter (joined by
Ginsburg), and Breyer dissented in separate opinions, all contending that there were such
standards. The pivotal opinion was by Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment
ordering dismissal, but on the basis that judicially manageable standards, while not
presented in Vieth, might emerge in future litigation. Id. at 309-11 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
95 Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 758 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (three-judge
court).
96 Higginbotham was appointed to the Fifth Circuit in 1982 (by Reagan), while
Ward and Rosenthal were appointed in 1999 (by Clinton) and 1992 (by Bush),
respectively. For a contrast of the composition of the earlier stage of the litigation, see
supra note 88. It consisted of Judges Higginbotham, Ward, and District Judge John
Hannah, Jr., an appointee of President Clinton. Balderas, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740,
at *6 (listing judges).
97 Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 515-31 (Ward, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
98 Henderson, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 779-85 (Ward, J., concurring). He also stated that
he was adhering to the views in his concurring and dissenting opinion in the 2004
decision. Id. at 784 n. 1.
99 Solimine, supra note 10, at 120-25; Note, Federal Court Involvement in
Redistricting Litigation, 114 HARv. L. REv. 878, 883-86 (2001). The popular press often
reports the presumed political affiliation of federal judges in election law cases. See, e.g.,
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to gauge such partisanship. Using the partisan affiliation of the appointing
President as a proxy for the ideology or attitudes of the appointed federal
judge is problematic. The appointment of a lower federal court judge may be
due in large part to the patronage of the senators from the state and other
-factors less related to ideology. 100 It may also be difficult to characterize a
particular reapportionment plan as helping only one party or the other.' 01 The
conventional wisdom is that in recent years many such plans have been
gerrymandered to help incumbents stay in office, not to aid one party or the
other as such (though the goals are not necessarily incompatible). 10 2 Even if
the majority of three-judge district court decisions on redistricting claims are
not examples of stark partisan decision making, 10 3 one must ask whether the
Ralph Blumenthal, DeLay Stays on the Ballot, Judges Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at
Al 1 (reporting appointing Presidents of federal judges who ruled in Tex. Democratic
Party v. Benkiser, No. A-06-CA-459-SS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47115 (W.D. Tex. July
6, 2006)). For additional examples from the election law context, see Solimine, supra
note 10, at 127-28. For criticism of this practice, on the basis that it "wrongly assumes
that federal judges cannot put aside their personal political beliefs and are motivated by
overt partisanship," see id at 127; see also Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court's Story:
Justice and Journalism at the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1557 (1996)
(describing policy of the New York Times to only provide such information "if such
identification makes sense as a news judgment in the context of a specific story," as
routinely providing this information would be "insinuating that all federal judges are
simply carrying out the agendas of their political sponsors").
100 Political scientists have long used the appointing President's political party as a
proxy for the presumed ideology of the appointed judge. Dissatisfied with this measure
for the reasons stated in the text, more recent studies have used more complicated
measures that are sensitive to the ideology of the senators from the state. For a review of
the controversy, see VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L.
MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE
DECISION MAKING 50-51 (2006). Rather than use the political party of the appointing
President, some studies have measured the ideology of Supreme Court Justices by
analyzing perceptions of nominees in editorials in prominent newspapers. JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 320-22 (2002).
101 Solimine, supra note 10, at 122-23.
102 For discussions of the considerable literature on this point, see Alan I.
Abramowitz, et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S.
House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75 (2006); Richard Forgette & John W. Winkle III, Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act, 87 Soc. Sc. Q. 155, 155-56 (2006); David
Lublin & Michael P. McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line?: The Impact of
Redistricting on Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L.J. 144 (2006).
103 Solimine, supra note 10, at 123 (discussing such cases and literature up to 1996
and concluding that there is not "compelling evidence of systematic partisan voting
behavior") (footnote omitted). A recent study, focusing on these cases decided from 1981
to 2006, lends support to this conclusion. Mark J. McKenzie, Beyond Partisanship?:
Federal Courts, State Commissions, and Redistricting ch.3 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D.
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LULAC litigation is the exception to the rule. The mid-decade redistricting
plan in Texas was unabashedly one to aid the GOP delegation; 104 the
Republican appointees on the lower court in LULAC upheld the plan, while
the Democratic appointee had reservations. 10 5 One's judgment on whether to
label this as partisan decision-making will depend, of course, on how
convincing one finds the opinions filed by these judges, and whether they
dissertation, University of Texas at Austin) (on file with author). The study examined all
decisions of three-judge district courts in redistricting cases, published in the Federal
Supplement or online, a total of 138 cases. Id. at 20-21 (describing dataset). Comparing
the partisan affiliation of the judges (using the party of the appointing President as a
proxy, id. at 2), the study concluded, among other things, that judges in these cases acted
as "constrained partisans." Id. at 14, 29. That is, while judges were more likely to strike
down (on either constitutional or VRA grounds) redistricting plans crafted by and
presumably favoring the opposite party, they were no more likely to strike down plans
produced in a bipartisan process as compared to those crafted by their own party. Id. at
29-30 (describing results).
It may also be useful to compare the judicial decision making in McConnell. That
panel consisted of two Republican appointees (Circuit Judge Henderson, appointed in
1990, and District Judge Leon, appointed in 2002) and one Democratic appointee
(District Judge Kollar-Kotelly, appointed in 1997). As discussed in Part I supra, Judges
Leon and Kollar-Kotelly crossed party lines, as it were, to uphold most of the BCRA,
against Judge Henderson's dissent. Moreover, it is difficult to characterize the BCRA as
automatically helping or hurting Democratic or Republican candidates. Cf CASS R.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 32 (2006) (Because campaign finance laws "are often challenged on First
Amendment grounds," as governmental abridgment of freedom of speech, authors
hypothesize that "Republican appointees would be more sympathetic than Democratic
appointees to this constitutional objection.").
104 LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2606 (2006); id. at 2629 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105 Cf McKenzie, supra note 103, at 16 (observing that the argument that Judge
Higginbotham engaged in partisan decision making in LULAC is weakened by the fact
that he was a member of the unanimous three-judge panel that had earlier left a
Democratic gerrymander in place, before the mid-decade redistricting, referring to
Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14,
2001)). Perhaps recognizing the politically charged nature of the case, several of the
Justices in LULAC seemed to go out of their way to praise the lower court judges,
collectively or individually. See, e.g., 126 S. Ct. at 2605 (majority opinion by Kennedy,
J.) (stating that the three-judge panel "brought considerable experience and expertise to
the instant case"); id at 2631 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(referring to the "characteristically thoughtful opinion written by Judge Higginbotham" in
2005); id. at 2653 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (referring to the "careful factfinding" by the "experienced judges"
on the district court).
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were applying the law and the facts in a principled fashion, irrespective of
their presumed personal views. 106
Another aspect of three-judge district court litigation revealed by LULAC
concerns the impact of summary dispositions of appeals from three-judge
district courts. The legal effect of the frequent summary affirmances is
unclear. The Supreme Court has stated that a summary affirmance is on the
merits and has precedential value, but only to the precise issues presented
and decided by the lower court. Beyond that, the Court as a whole, and
individual Justices, have not spoken clearly or consistently with respect to
how much precedential weight the Court itself should give to summary
affirmances.1 07 Not surprisingly, the Court has also been unclear on how
much precedential weight lower federal courts should give to these
dispositions.' 08
A good example of this lack of clarity is the Cox v. Larios litigation.
There, a three-judge district court heard a challenge to the reapportionment
of the state legislature that was consistent with one-person, one-vote
principles, but based in part on political gerrymandering that aided
Democrats. The court found the reapportionment to be unconstitutional, 10 9
and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed. " 0 Justice Stevens concurred in
that disposition, in part on the basis that, in his view, the facts in Cox would
justify a finding of improper political gerrymandering after the Vieth case,
decided shortly before Cox.lII In contrast, Justice Scalia, in dissent from the
summary disposition, would have set the case for argument, for in his view
precedent was not clear on the questions addressed by the district court. He
added that "[t]his is not a petition for certiorari, however, but an appeal, and
we should not summarily affirm unless it is clear that the disposition of this
case is correct."1 12 Cox was a source of great confusion, since it "seemed to
106 Put another way, this inquiry should weigh whether and to what extent the
decisions of the lower court judges (or the Supreme Court Justices, upon review) can be
characterized as examples of the legal model (i.e., applying legal analysis in a principled
manner), the attitudinal model (i.e., applying one's policy views), or the rational choice
or strategic model (i.e., considering the likely reaction to a decision, by Congress and
other actors), or some combination of the above. For a useful review and summary of the
considerable literature discussing and attempting to apply these models, see LAWRENCE
BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 5-21
(2006); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEx. L. REV. 257 (2005).
107 For an excellent discussion of the cases, see STERN, supra note 83, at 279-81.
10 8 Id. at 281-85.
109 Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (per curiam) (three-
judge court).
110 Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
111 Id. at 949-50 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 951 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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contradict the logic, if not the holding, of Vieth," 113 which had left very little
doctrinal space open to pursue a political gerrymandering claim.
The confusion was evidenced in the Court's resolution of LULAC. The
Justices sparred over the meaning of the summary disposition in Cox. Justice
Kennedy for the majority asserted that the reasoning of the lower court in
Cox was not conclusive on whether and how political gerrymanders were
actionable. 114 In contrast, Justice Stevens contended (not surprisingly, in
light of his concurring opinion in that case) that Cox demonstrated there
could be judicially manageable standards to assess the legality of political
gerrymanders."l 5 If there were no such standards, he added, "we would not
have summarily affirmed the decision in Cox over the dissent of only one
Justice."" 16 The debate over the meaning of the lower court opinion in Cox,
and over the significance of the Court's summary disposition, illustrates the
mischief caused by such dispositions of direct appeals. The Court places
itself in the awkward position of subsequently explaining the precedential
value of a summary disposition by discussing the opinion of the lower court
which was affirmed. Such dispositions are neither fish nor fowl; a certiorari
denial leaves the lower court holding intact but does not imply any approval
by the Court, while a full resolution of a case on the merits is binding on the
Court and lower courts. Summary dispositions do not enjoy the clarity of
either of those positions." 17
113 Hasen, supra note 2, at 683. For similar expressions of the confusion left by Cox,
see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of
Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 564-69 (2004); Richard H. Pildes, The
Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics,
118 HARv. L. REv. 28, 76-78 (2004).
114 LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2612 (2006).
115 Id. at 2635 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116 Id. at 2635 n.5 (citation omitted).
117 There are other examples of election law jurisprudence muddled by summary
dispositions of appeals from three-judge district courts. For example, the Court in Wells
v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973) summarily affirmed a decision which held that the
election of state judges was not governed by the one-person, one-vote principles, because
those principles only apply to representative branches of government which, it was
asserted, the judiciary was not. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972)
(three-judge court). Nearly two decades later, the Court was faced with the issue of
whether elected state judges were "representatives" coverable by Section 2(b) of the
VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000). The majority in Chisom v. Roemer found that Wells
was a reapportionment, not a VRA, case, and was not controlling. 501 U.S. 380, 402-03
(1991). Justice Scalia, in his dissent, found Wells to be relevant, as he argued that the
intent of the drafters of the 1982 Amendments of the VRA, at issue in Chisom, would
have been the same as that suggested by the disposition of Wells. Id. at 411, 415 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Another example is suggested by the summary affirmance in Parker v.
Ohio, 540 U.S. 1013 (2003). The lower court in that case had held in part that the alleged
failure to create multi-racial legislative "influence districts" was not cognizable under
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Finally, LULAC illustrates the uncertainties resulting from the review of
factual findings by lower courts. The Justices sparred over the deference to
be given fact finding by the lower court. The majority dutifully invoked the
deference appellate courts usually give to such findings by lower courts,
118
and did so in most instances, save for the holding of the lower court that the
creation of a certain district did not violate the VRA.1 9 It is not entirely clear
whether the latter decision of the Court should be regarded as a holding that a
finding of fact was clearly erroneous, as opposed to a de novo review of a
question of law, or a review of a mixed question of law or fact. The
dissenters on that point appeared to assume that it was a finding of fact, and
accordingly chided the majority for not giving sufficient deference to the
lower court.120 The lengthy discussion of the facts in all of the opinions is
dizzying, no matter what level of deference was purportedly at use. In my
view, the majority's disagreement with the lower court is best viewed as a
review of a mixed question of law or fact, and in that instance less appellate
deference is appropriate. 12'
Section 2 of the VRA. Parker v. Ohio, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104-05 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(three-judge court). Lower courts have taken divergent approaches to this issue, see
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 777-79 (rev. 2d ed. 2002) (discussing cases); DANIEL HAYS
LOwENsTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW 211-12 (3d ed. 2004) (same), and the
Court arguably sent an ambiguous signal by resolving Parker in the way it did.
118 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2614.
119 Id. at 2615-19 (holding, inter alia, that lower court did not sufficiently consider
the "compactness" prong of the three-part test established by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) to determine whether a plaintiff has stated a claim under Section 2
of the VRA).
120 Id. at 2655-57 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part); id. at 2665 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
121 Saunders, supra note 86, at 183-84 (reviewing cases and noting that the Court
has not clearly stated the standard of review for mixed questions, and arguing that de
novo review is appropriate in these circumstances). It is instructive to compare the level
of appellate review of facts in other cases discussed in this Article. For McConnell, see
LOWENsTEIN & HASEN, supra note 117, at 935-36 (questioning which opinion in the
lower court the majority of the Court gave factual deference). For Randall, see Randall v.
Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (2006) (noting that First Amendment interests require
Court to review record carefully and independently).
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III. SUPREME COURT AGENDA-SETTING AND SUPERVISION OF LOWER
COURTS IN ELECTION LAW CASES
A. The Mysteries of the Supreme Court's Docket
There are at least two mysteries regarding the Supreme Court's docket:
why have the Court's decisions rendered on the merits shrunk from the low
hundreds in the early years of the Rehnquist Court to the seventy-five or
eighty decided each Term since the mid-1990s; and why does the Court
select the cases to decide that it does? Neither the Court collectively nor its
individual members frequently speak to these issues. The shrunken docket is
the easier to explain. It is likely due to a combination of factors, including the
statutory repeal, in the 1970s and 1980s, of most mandatory appellate
jurisdiction, 122 the change in the Court's personnel and the turnover of lower
court judges, the apparent desire of at least some of the Justices to lessen the
role of the Court in American life, and less frequent appeals by the federal
government. 123
The reasons for the Court's discretionary exercise of review over
particular cases have always been unclear. The Court's own rules only
blandly state that it will be more likely to review cases which can resolve a
split of authority among lower courts, or which present an opportunity to
resolve an "important question of federal law."'124 Sometimes the Court, in
the opinion on the merits, will explain why it granted review in a case; it did
not do so in Randall or LULAC. A wide variety of factors have been
suggested to explain why the Court agrees, or does not agree, to hear cases.
122 This would include the restriction of the jurisdiction of the three-judge district
court in 1976, which led to far fewer such cases and fewer direct appeals. See supra notes
73-74 and accompanying text.
123 For a full discussion of these and other possible reasons, see Margaret
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's Plenary Docket, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the
Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403; Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second
Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 640-44 (2003);
David M. O'Brien, A Diminished Plenary Docket: A Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 89
JUDICATURE 134 (2005); Kevin M. Scott, Shaping the Supreme Court's Federal
Certiorari Docket, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 191 (2006). Cf Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The
Court's Agenda-And the Nation's, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8-9 (2006) (discussing issues
of importance to the public that are not addressed in Supreme Court decisions).
124 SUP. CT. R. 10 (considerations governing review on certiorari). While the parallel
rule dealing with direct appeals, Supreme Court Rule 18, does not expressly state the
criteria the Court employs to decide whether to grant an appeal a full review, it is
understood by litigators before the Court that the jurisdictional statement required by that
rule should explain (not unlike a certiorari petition) why the Court should give plenary
review to the appeal, rather than a summary disposition. STERN, supra note 83, at 481-82.
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The suggestions start with largely subjective considerations of what is an
important issue of federal law, perhaps informed by the characteristics of the
lower court decision litigants, or of signals by the parties or by amici. In
addition to or in lieu of such factors, it has also been suggested that Justices
take their own policy preferences into account; for example, whether they
wish to affirm or reverse the decision below. In addition, Justices might act
strategically, taking into account the likely voting behavior on the merits of
their fellow Justices. 125
B. Supreme Court Agenda Setting and Lower Court Adjudication
What light do these factors shed on the Court's decisions to review, or
not to review, election law cases? A complete answer to this question would
require intensive case studies of cases selected, or not selected, for review,
and is beyond the scope of the present Article. Speaking more generally, as
observed at the outset of the Article, the Court, over the past several decades,
has not evaded plenary consideration of many election law cases. Perhaps the
Justices see legal questions raised by the operation of the processes of
democracy to be inherently important, in the sense that they are first order
issues of self-governance that are antecedent to the development of
substantive policy by all of the branches of government. 126 Among election
law cases, Justices are no doubt influenced by, among other things, the
general interest of elites in the legal and policy-making communities for
particular subjects. For example, Professor Richard Pildes has noted that
125 There is a rich literature exploring all of these factors. In addition to the sources
cited supra note 123, see VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: How
JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA (2006); PERRY, supra note
83; Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389
(2004); Friedman, supra note 106, at 292-95; Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine,
Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SuP. CT.
ECON. REv. 171, 174-75 (2001). Scholars have come to different conclusions on the
explanatory strength of these factors. Compare PERRY, supra note 83, at 146-66, 198-
251 (concluding, based on interviews of the Justices and their clerks, that while strategic
considerations are not totally absent, legal factors largely drive decisions to review), and
Cordray & Cordray, supra, at 391 (reaching similar conclusion based on review of
certiorari votes), with Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping
in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 570 (1999) (concluding, based on a
review of votes on certiorari in the 1982 Term, that there was considerable strategic
voting).
126 For discussions of the importance of these first order questions, see
ISSACHAROFF, supra note 117, at 1-2 (discussing democratic processes in general);
LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 117, at 29-30 (discussing right to vote); Schauer,
supra note 123, at 46-47, 47 n.168.
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"[c]ommentators, judges, and editorialists across the domestic political
spectrum had urged the Court to address the problem"'127 of political
gerrymanders, which it did in Vieth, and again in LULAC. The same could be
said of campaign finance regulation, especially after Congress revisited the
issue with the passage of the BCRA.
Congress, for its own reasons, has facilitated this process by passing
special direct review statutes or leaving litigation of reapportionment and
related VRA cases before three-judge district courts. But these statutes might
be characterized as forcing the hand of the Court, by prompting it to decide
cases that it might not otherwise, without the benefit of an initial appellate
review in that case. Moreover, being, in effect, compelled to decide a case
might deprive the Court of the presumed benefits of permitting a legal issue
to percolate in the lower courts before certiorari of a particular case is
granted. 128 There is some evidence that the Court considers this a problem.
The Court frequently summarily affirms direct appeals from three-judge
district courts in election law cases, 129 even though such dispositions are,
arguably, less justified in the past three decades, after the 1976 legislation
restricting the jurisdiction of those courts. Similarly, the Court remanded the
first direct appeal in the LULAC litigation for reconsideration in light of
Vieth, 130 an odd disposition to some, 131 since the Court could have
summarily affirmed the lower court's decision that there was no improper
gerrymander (the same result the majority reached in 2006). Perhaps the
Court felt uncomfortable deciding Vieth and LULAC in such rapid-fire
succession. 132 The spacing out of resolution of direct appeals in this way
may, in effect, restore the benefits of percolation. 133
127 Pildes, supra note 113, at 56 (footnote omitted).
128 For further discussion, see Solimine, supra note 10, at 105-07.
129 See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text (discussing the Cox litigation
and additional election law cases); see, e.g., O'Lear v. Miller, 537 U.S. 997 (2002)
(summarily affirming political gerrymandering case, O'Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d
862 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (per curiam)). Occasionally the Court will note probable
jurisdiction to a direct appeal from a three-judge district court and rule on the merits at
the same time, without full briefing and oral argument. E.g., Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct.
1198, 1200 (2006) (per curiam).
130 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
131 E.g., Hasen, supra note 2, at 683.
132 Had LULAC come up by way of certiorari, rather than by appeal, perhaps the
Court would have denied certiorari, waiting for further percolation in the lower courts on
gerrymandering and related issues. By the same token, once the Court decides to decide
an election law case on the merits, it will not necessarily attempt to evade difficult issues
presented. While not involving a direct appeal, the Court, in Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct.
2479, 2487 (2006), declined a suggestion in an amicus brief to dismiss the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted, insofar as it permitted review of the issue of
Vermont's expenditure limits, the issue to be remanded under the Second Circuit
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This description oversimplifies Supreme Court review of election law
cases, because there is undoubtedly a sort of complex and continuous
feedback mechanism between lower courts and the Court. The number of
cases the Court does decide to review, and the content of those decisions,
affects subsequent lower court decisions, which in turn impacts the
production of cases the Court will be asked to review. 134 Conventional
wisdom, for example, holds that if the Court develops and applies legal
principles characterized by indeterminate standards, as opposed to bright line
rules, then lower court rulings will suffer by the confusion and
uncertainty. 135 Election law cases are not immune from this critique. Some
commentators were scornful of the lack of doctrinal clarity or coherence in
McConnell and Vieth, 136 and such criticism is unlikely to abate in the wake
of Randall and L ULA C. 137
decision. See Brief for Senator John McCain, Senator Russell Feingold, Representative
Christoper Shays, and Representative Martin Meehan as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 17-18 n.16, Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (nos. 04-1528, 04-
1530 & 04-1697). The Court made no mention of this request, though Justice Souter
stated that he would not "disturb the Court of Appeals's stated intention to remand."
Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2512 (Souter, J., dissenting). In a similar fashion, Justice Souter, in
LULAC, stated that he would not have reached the partisan gerrymander issue, given that
there was no majority of the Court, in his view, that was ready to apply a "single
criterion," so he treated "the broad issue of gerrymander much as the subject of an
improvident grant of certiorari." LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2647 (2006) (Souter,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority of his colleagues did not agree
with him on that point. Cf Schauer, supra note 123, at 34 (observing that both Randall
and LULAC avoided being "momentous" decisions by, respectively, not overruling
Buckley v. Valeo, and not placing restrictions on partisan gerrymandering).
133 Consider that between David v. Bandamer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986), in which a
plurality of the Court held that political gerrymanders could be justiciable under some
circumstances, and the decision to note probable jurisdiction to revisit the issue in Vieth,
cases raising that issue were decided by various three-judge district courts, some of which
were appealed and summarily affirmed. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279-80,
280 n.6 (plurality opinion) (citing and discussing these cases, and noting that all had held
against the plaintiffs).
134 For further discussions of this feedback mechanism, see BAIRD, supra note 125;
Vanessa A. Baird, The Effect of Politically Salient Decisions on the US. Supreme
Court's Agenda, 66 J. POL. 755, 758 (2004); Mark S. Hurwitz, Institutional
Arrangements and the Dynamics of Agenda Formation in the US. Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals, 28 LAw & POL'Y 321 (2006).
135 For a review and critique of the considerable literature on this issue, see Carolyn
Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error
Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 271 (2006).
136 See Hasen, supra note 2, at 669-70 (summarizing criticism of both of those
cases). Cf HASEN, supra note 1, at 8, 47-49 (arguing that in some election law cases, the
Supreme Court should issue vague standards, so that it does not adopt a single vision of
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This line of criticism can be overstated. The Supreme Court, of course,
reviews very few cases from all areas of the law, and yet in the minds of
most people, lower court decision making does not collapse in incoherence.
A useful model for understanding the hierarchal relationship between the
Supreme Court and lower courts is that of principal and agent. 138 The Court
is the principal, monitoring the actions of its agents, the lower courts, in
applying the law. Simply because each case is not reviewed does not mean
lower court judges feel free to, or do, run amuck applying federal law.
Federal district judges, in non-three-judge district court cases at least, know
that there can be an appeal as of right to the circuit court. Circuit judges in
such cases will know most of their decisions will not be appealed or, if they
are, will be denied certiorari. But they can never be sure which cases might
end up before the Supreme Court. The aversion to reversal and, more
importantly, the internalization of the application of precedent are surely
robust checks on the independence of lower court decision making. 139
Perhaps the alleged incoherence of Supreme Court doctrine can be
overstated as well. Consider the Supreme Court's controversial decision in
1993 in Shaw v. Reno,140 which placed vague restraints on the ability of state
legislatures to create so-called racially gerrymandered legislative districts.
The vagueness no doubt led the Supreme Court to revisit the issue in several
subsequent cases. 141 As Pildes observes, many commentators (himself
political equality, and to give space to lower courts to fashion different approaches to
these questions, which could aid the Court when it eventually reviews such cases).
137 For example, Justice Thomas, in Randall, argued that the five factors the
plurality opinion of Justice Breyer used to evaluate the constitutionality of Vermont's
contribution limits, 126 S. Ct. at 2495-99, were a "newly minted, multifactor test" which
requires the Court to evaluate the "propriety of regulations of political speech based upon
little more than its impression of the appropriate limits." Id. at 2503 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original).
138 For an overview of the literature developing and applying this model, see Tracey
E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A Principal-Agent Perspective,
47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 819 (2003) (applying model to federal courts); Michael E. Solimine,
The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1457, 1476-77 (2005) (applying model to
Supreme Court review of state courts).
139 See Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 369, 371 (2005); Friedman, supra note 106, at 295-305; Kevin M. Scott,
Understanding Judicial Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate
Judges, 40 LAW & SOC'y REV. 163, 182-83 (2006).
140 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993).
141 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 901 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 956
(1996); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 77 (1997); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,
543 (1999); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001); see also United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 739 (1995) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a
Shaw v. Reno-type claim); Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28, 29 (2000) (per curiam).
2007]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
included) predicted the "amorphous doctrine would lead to frequent Shaw
litigation after the 2000 redistricting."' 142 "Yet," Pildes continues, "the
predicted disorder did not occur," and "rather than a deluge of Shaw
litigation, there has been almost no such litigation at all."'143 Pildes attributes
the trickle of litigation to state legislators having "internalized the vague
legal constraints of Shaw in ways that generated a stable equilibrium,"' 144 and
"vague law was transformed into settled practice."' 145 It is too soon to tell if
Randall or LULAC will similarly generate less litigation than might be
expected. Much will depend, of course, on whether, and to what extent, the
Supreme Court decides to hear cases that raise the same or similar issues.
The direct review statutes that govern much Shaw and now LULAC-type
litigation have not prevented the Court from being flexible in this regard.
Direct review statutes aside, it is often difficult to predict when the Court
will choose to decide election law cases. Consider two recent examples. In
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 146 the Court held that an ethical
code that prohibited candidates for state judicial office from announcing their
views on disputed legal or political issues violated the First Amendment.
Several issues of judicial campaign speech were left open by White, two of
which are whether partisan or solicitation activities of judicial candidates can
be restricted. Those issues were addressed upon remand in White, and the
Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, eventually held those restrictions in
Minnesota to be unconstitutional. 147 Despite the urgings of the American Bar
Association, ten state attorneys general, and others to review the decision, 148
along with the considerable publicity the case had generated, the Court
denied certiorari early in 2006.149 Perhaps the Court was waiting for more
142 Pildes, supra note 113, at 67 (footnote omitted); see also Solimine, supra note
10, at 81 n. 12 (similarly predicting that Shaw would generate litigation that would return
to the Supreme Court).
143 Pildes, supra note 113, at 67 (footnote omitted).
14 4 Id. at 68.
145 Id. at 69 (footnote omitted). Pildes also explores a variety of other factors which
account for the paucity of Shaw litigation. Id. at 69 n. 178.
146 536 U.S. 765 (2002). The vote was 5-4. Justice Scalia wrote the majority
opinion, and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter dissented.
147 Republican Party of Minn. v. White ("White II"), 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005)
(en banc).
148 Press Release, Justice at Stake, High Court Decision Could Open Floodgates of
Money into America's Courtrooms (Jan. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcrumb=7,55,744.
149 Dimick v. Republican Party of Minn., 126 S. Ct. 1165, 1166 (2006).
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developments in the lower courts on this issue, a wish that no doubt will be
granted. 150
In a like fashion, the application of the Equal Protection Clause to the
counting of ballots in Bush v. Gore151 seemed destined to generate more
litigation, as indeed it has. 152 Some of those cases were trial court decisions,
or appeals from requests for preliminary injunctive relief. However, the
appellate court in Stewart v. Blackwell' 53 reviewed a district court decision
based on a full trial record, and the split Sixth Circuit held that the selective
use of punch ballots in Ohio elections violated the principles of Bush v. Gore.
The state's petition for rehearing en banc was granted.' 54 The case was later
vacated as moot. 155 Given the controversy still surrounding Bush v. Gore,156
it is not at all clear that the Court would be inclined to grant review. Yet there
will be more such litigation, 157 and it is difficult to believe that the Court will
be able or inclined to evade review of such cases indefinitely.
V. CONCLUSION: THE LEGALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROCESSES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Election law scholarship has recently been dominated by two
overlapping debates. 158 Some scholars argue that courts in general, and the
Supreme Court in particular, should play a reduced role in the supervision of
150 See Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1127,
1133-44 (2006) (discussing post- Wite litigation in the lower courts).
151 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
152 For a discussion of that litigation, see Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v.
Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007); Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, Litigating
Bush v. Gore in the States: Dual Voting Systems and the Fourteenth Amendment, 51
VILL. L. REV. 229, 278-94 (2006).
153 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006).
154 Stewart v. Blackwell, No. 05-3044 (6th Cir. July 21, 2006) (order vacating panel
decision and ordering rehearing en banc).
155 Stewart v. Blackwell, 473 F.3d 692, 694 (6th Cir. 2007) (vacating and remanding
as moot).
156 See Pildes, supra note 113, at 83 n.226 (arguing that Bush v. Gore "remains so
explosive" that parties before the Supreme Court, and the Justices themselves, refrain
from addressing the implications of the case). Bush v. Gore was not mentioned in any of
the opinions in Randall and LULAC.
157 E.g., Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (11th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 934 (2007). For the prospects and impact of the likelihood (or lack
thereof) of Supreme Court review of cases raising Bush v. Gore-like issues, see Foley,
supra note 152.
158 For a useful overview of these debates, by a contributor to them, see Guy-Uriel
Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1099, 1100-01 (2005)
(reviewing HASEN, supra note 1).
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electoral law issues, and that in general such issues should be left for
resolution to the democratic process itself.'59 Other scholars have argued that
judicial intervention is necessary to police the potential self-interested
manipulation of electoral processes by officials and political parties. 160
Within the latter field, there is robust debate over the scope of judicial
review. One school would limit judicial review to the protection of individual
rights. 161 Others see the purpose of judicial review in this context as
primarily protecting the structure of democratic institutions to achieve
competition or other goals. 162 The outcome of these debates, which will no
doubt be continued with vigor in the wake of Randall and LULAC, has
consequences for the scope of election law doctrine. 163
What have not been given sufficient attention in these debates are the
processes and institutions of court review. To be sure, the relevant
scholarship acknowledges and discusses the direct review provisions and
other unique aspects of some election law cases, but rarely does it
systematically evaluate what type of court processes and institutions are
optimal to litigate such cases. 164 This lack of attention is problematic on two
levels. First, as I have endeavored to demonstrate in this Article, the peculiar
procedures established to govern litigation of some election law cases are, for
good or ill, not necessarily outcome-neutral, and can have important
consequences for the development of election law doctrine. Second, it seems
to be common ground that judicial decision making in election law cases is
particularly ripe for the accusation of partisan or result-oriented outcomes. 165
159 E.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have to be Liberal to Hate the Racial
Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of
Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-
Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002).
160 E.g., Issacharoff, supra note 71; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643
(1998).
161 E.g., HASEN, supra note 1.
162 E.g., Pildes, supra note 113.
163 See Charles, supra note 158.
164 Some exceptions to these generalizations would include Karlan, supra note 80;
Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50
STAN. L. REV. 731, 753-62 (1998); see Note, supra note 99.
165 E.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1038 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Given
the uniquely political nature of the redistricting process, I fear the impact [that the
application of Shaw v. Reno and its progeny] will have on the public's perception of the
impartiality of the Federal Judiciary."); Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir.
2005) (Sack & Katzmann, JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that
"highly partisan and political caste" of campaign finance cases is "bound to have, or at
least to be seen as to have, an impact favoring one political side or another depending on
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In this environment, it is particularly important that the processes of judicial
review are, and be perceived as, non-partisan in nature, 166 as has been
persuasively argued for non-judicial personnel and institutions administering
electoral processes.167
A decade ago I advocated several reforms to the judicial process in
election law cases. Among other things, I suggested that the purported
advantages of three-judge district courts, such as "greater deliberation, better
'systematic' results, more rapid Supreme Court review [were] modest
indeed,"'168 and that Congress should consider abolishing those courts, and
permit reapportionment cases to be litigated like any other case in federal
court. Short of that, I argued that three-judge district courts should be
constituted in as non-partisan and random a process as possible, to avoid
charges that chief judges of circuits have stacked such panels to achieve a
certain result. 169 Ten years of litigation before such courts have not
convinced me otherwise. Also, the Court should reconsider its frequent but
problematic practice of summarily disposing of (and particularly by
affirming) appeals from such courts. At the very least, if summary
affirmances are still used, they should have no precedential value for other
cases, and should be treated like the unpublished dispositions that they
resemble. Finally, I am not convinced that the direct review regime
exemplified by the McConnell litigation has been an optimal one, and
Congress should not enact direct-review statutes in the future. In short, and in
general, election law cases are not unique enough to justify a separate
litigation process.
the result"); see also Note, supra note 99, at 885-90 (discussing possible partisan
influences on federal and state judges in redistricting litigation).
166 See Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1326, 1336-37 (1994); Solimine, supra note 10, at 127-28.
167 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 66, at 973-91 (arguing that appointed, non-partisan
officials should administer elections rather than elected officials); Issacharoff, supra note
71, at 644 (discussing blue-ribbon commissions and other approaches to attain non-
partisan redistricting).
168 Solimine, supra note 10, at 126.
169 Id at 134-35. I am in favor of chief judges having no more than one circuit
judge sit on the panels, and drawing on judges who sit in the state in question. On the
other hand, I am opposed to chief judges deliberately seeking an ideological balance on
such panels to give them a more bipartisan flavor. Id. at 135.
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City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982).
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NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166 (1985).
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480 (1985).
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987).
1991-2000
Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991).
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992).
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996).
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9 (1996).
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997).
City of Monroe v. United States, 522 U.S. 34 (1997).
Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
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Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28 (2000).
170 See supra note 8 for the source of these cases.
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